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Hidden profiles are group-decision tasks in which 
the correct solution cannot be detected by an indi-
vidual group member prior to the group discussion, 
because each member possesses a subset of  infor-
mation supporting an inferior decision alternative 
(Stasser & Titus, 1985). This is due to the distribu-
tion of  shared and unshared information across indi-
viduals: shared information is available to all group 
members prior to discussion, whereas unshared 
information is uniquely held by one member only. 
In the case of  hidden profiles, shared and unshared 
information have different decisional implications, 
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and the alternative implied by the unshared 
information is the correct one. Hidden profiles 
therefore represent the prototype of  situations in 
which groups have the potential to outperform 
individual decision-makers. Unfortunately, groups 
typically fail to solve hidden profiles. In most cases, 
they choose the alternative implied by their mem-
bers’ shared information (for reviews, see Brodbeck, 
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007; 
Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 
2006; Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003).
Group-level explanations for the failure 
of  groups to solve hidden profiles
Two group-level processes have been proposed 
to account for the failure of  groups to solve hidden 
profiles: according to one explanation, groups do 
not discuss sufficient unshared information for 
the superiority of  the correct solution to become 
evident (Stasser, 1992). This dominance of  shared 
information has been attributed to the simple fact 
that shared information can be mentioned by 
each group member whereas unshared informa-
tion, by definition, is known by only one member 
and therefore cannot be discussed if  this member 
fails to mention it (i.e., there is a probabilistic 
sampling advantage for shared information; 
Stasser, 1992). Other authors have traced the 
dominance of  shared information back to the 
fact that shared, but not unshared, information 
can be socially validated by other group members 
during discussion (Parks & Cowlin, 1996). Social 
validation refers to learning that others in the 
group possess the same information and there-
fore can attest to its accuracy. As proposed by 
Wittenbaum, Hubbell, and Zuckerman (1999), 
social validation fuels a group’s tendency to repeat 
previously mentioned shared information. In 
addition, there is evidence that social validation 
increases the perceived accuracy and relevance of  
information which, in turn, increases the decisional 
impact of  information (Mojzisch, Schulz-Hardt, 
Kerschreiter, Brodbeck, & Frey, 2008).
According to the second explanation, group 
members primarily use the discussion to negotiate 
their preferences rather than to consider the relevant 
information (Gigone & Hastie, 1993). In the case of  
a hidden profile, this negotiation focus is likely to 
lead to a premature consensus on a suboptimal 
alternative, because the hidden profile distribu-
tion of  information implies suboptimal individual 
preferences at the beginning of  the discussion 
and, therefore, the correct solution has hardly any 
proponents in the negotiation process.
The individual preference effect
Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) proposed 
an alternative explanation for the failure of  
groups to solve hidden profiles, the individual pref-
erence effect. They argued that even in the absence 
of  any dysfunctional group-level processes, the 
development of  a suboptimal prediscussion pref-
erence leads to biased evaluation of  the informa-
tion exchanged during discussion: information 
supporting the group members’ prediscussion 
preferences (preference-consistent information) is 
perceived to be of  higher quality than informa-
tion contradicting those preferences (preference-
inconsistent information). Because of  this evaluation 
bias, group members tend to stick to their initial 
suboptimal preferences even if  all unshared 
information is discussed and no premature group 
consensus is reached. It should be noted that the 
reason for this evaluation bias need not be some 
sort of  defensive avoidance, that is, an intentional 
distortion of  information. Rather, a biased evalu-
ation in favor of  members’ prediscussion pre-
ferences could simply be a consequence of  different 
amounts of  cognitive resources being alloca- 
ted to preference-consistent versus preference- 
inconsistent information: as outlined by Edwards 
and Smith (1996), people might use the inconsis-
tency between their prior beliefs and the newly 
learned preference-inconsistent information as a 
cue that either this information or their prior be-
lief  could be false, and therefore instigate a more 
detailed analysis of  this piece of  information. 
Conversely, the match of  preference-consistent 
information with prior beliefs indicates that this 
piece of  information can be accepted without 
much further testing. As a consequence of  the 
more intensive testing of  preference-inconsistent 
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information, group members are more likely 
to detect weaknesses in it, making preference- 
inconsistent information appear to be of  lower 
quality on average than preference-consistent 
information (cf. Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 
2003). Empirical support for this idea can be found 
in research on motivated reasoning (e.g., Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, 
& Lockhart, 1998) and the prior-belief  effect (e.g., 
Edwards & Smith, 1996).
In the experiments by Greitemeyer and Schulz-
Hardt (2003), participants first received incom-
plete information about a decision task which was 
either representative of  the entire information set 
(manifest profile;1 Lavery, Franz, Winquist, & 
Larson, 1999) or was not (hidden profile). Next, 
instead of  discussing the decision case with each 
other, participants individually read a fictitious 
discussion protocol containing full information 
exchange but with no group decision being reached. 
They were asked to rate the importance, accuracy, 
and valence of  each piece of  information and to 
reach a final individual decision. The results 
showed that few participants solved the hidden 
profile. Preference-consistent information was 
judged to be of  higher quality than preference-
inconsistent information, and this evaluation bias 
mediated the tendency of  individuals to stick to 
their initial preferences. In sum, the individual pref-
erence effect impedes the solution of  hidden pro-
files even if  all information is exchanged and no 
preference negotiation takes place.
The present research
The present experiments aimed to provide a critical 
test for the idea that the individual preference effect 
in group decision-making is indeed an individual-
level phenomenon. At first glance, the experiments 
by Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) seem to 
provide unequivocal evidence for the prediction 
that groups fail to solve hidden profiles even in the 
absence of  dysfunctional group-level processes. 
However, a closer look reveals that their experimen-
tal setup still contained two group-level processes.
First, the misleading shared information was 
supported by social validation. As outlined in the first 
of  the two Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) 
experiments, participants in the hidden profile con-
dition were less likely to detect the best candidate 
than participants in the manifest profile condition. 
However, these two conditions differed not only 
with regard to the participants’ initial preferences, 
but also with regard to which items were socially 
validated in the discussion protocol: each time a 
shared item was mentioned by a group member, 
the protocol contained a passage about the other 
members confirming that they held the same infor-
mation. Since most of  the shared items supported 
the correct candidate in the manifest profile condi-
tion but an incorrect candidate in the hidden 
profile condition, preference consistency and social 
validation of  information were partially confounded. 
As research has demonstrated that social validation 
increases the perceived quality of  information 
(Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2003; Mojzisch, 
Grouneva, & Schulz-Hardt, in press; Mojzisch et al., 
2008; Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Wittenbaum 
et al., 19992), the failure of  individuals to solve the 
hidden profile could be a consequence of  social vali-
dation rather than a consequence of  the participants’ 
initial preferences. In their second experiment, 
Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt showed that subopti-
mal individual preferences hinder the solution of  
hidden profiles over and above any social validation 
effects. In other words, when social validation is 
present, suboptimal individual preferences have an 
additional hindering effect on the solution of  hidden 
profiles. However, they did not test for individual 
preference effects in the absence of  social validation. 
Therefore, based on their results we do not know 
whether or not the individual preference effect is 
contingent upon the copresence of  social validation.
Second, in the Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt 
(2003) study, the information was presented in a 
discussion format. Since the protocol used was 
designed to look like an authentic transcript of  a 
discussion of  a three-person group, some typical 
attributes of  verbal social interaction were retained, 
such as whole sentences and filler words. Hence, 
the protocol included residues of  group processes. 
Such residues could have complicated the detection 
of  the correct solution. For instance, phrases con-
taining decision-irrelevant information could have 
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distracted some of  the readers’ attention from the 
decision-relevant information. Moreover, lack of  
structuring (i.e., running text instead of  tallying 
pieces of  information describing each candidate) 
could have made it more difficult for participants to 
relate the decision-relevant pieces of  information 
to each other, which is necessary if  the information 
pattern reflecting the quality of  the decision alter-
natives described is to be identified (Voigtlaender, 
Pfeiffer, & Schulz-Hardt, 2009). Somewhat related 
to this, Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, and Thelen 
(2001) have shown that preference-consistent 
information-processing is stronger if  information 
is presented sequentially as compared to simultane-
ously, and a discussion is a prototype of  a sequen-
tial information presentation format. Thus, it could 
be argued that the residues of  group processes con-
tained in the experimental material of  Greitemeyer 
and Schulz-Hardt impeded the solution of  the hid-
den profile compared to a situation without any 
features of  a group discussion, for example, if  the 
additional information had been presented as a 
simple list of  items.
In sum, based on the experiments reported by 
Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) it would be 
premature to conclude that the individual prefer-
ence effect is a purely individual-level process. 
Instead, it is possible that this effect requires the 
copresence of  two group-level processes, namely 
(a) social validation of  the information support-
ing the suboptimal individual preference, and 
(b) presentation of  the full information exchange 
in a discussion format. Both of  these group-level 
residues could make it more difficult to detect the 
correct solution. To resolve this ambiguity, in one 
experiment we tested for individual preference 
effects in the absence of  social validation effects. 
In a second experiment, we eliminated all aspects 
of  verbal social interaction from the simulation 
of  full information exchange.
But even if  we accept that the individual pref-
erence effect constitutes a purely individual-level 
explanation of  why groups are unlikely to solve 
hidden profiles, it is unclear how much of  the over-
all failure is due to the individual preference effect 
as compared to the group-level processes that 
have been previously discovered. As has been 
demonstrated in many studies, groups tend to focus 
on shared information during discussion and, 
therefore, omit the critical unshared information 
from discussion. Obviously, if  the information 
necessary to detect the correct solution is not 
exchanged at all, groups will fail to solve a hidden 
profile independently of  whether or not they asym-
metrically evaluate the information in the light of  
their members’ initial preferences. In other words, 
when placed alongside the other explanations for 
the inability of  groups to solve hidden profiles, the 
individual preference effect may only have a rela-
tively weak effect. We cannot determine the relative 
importance of  the individual preference effect as 
no data are available on this issue. As a first step 
towards rectifying this situation, in Experiment 2 
we tested to what extent it is necessary to refer to 
group processes to explain the empirically observed 
low solution rates of  real interacting groups.
Experiment 1
The aim of  Experiment 1 was to determine 
whether the individual preference effect impedes 
the solution of  hidden profiles in the absence of  
social validation of  information supporting the 
group members’ individual suboptimal preferences. 
The experimental procedure mostly followed 
that of  Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003; 
Experiment 1). Participants received individual 
information about three job candidates A, B, and C, 
and were asked to indicate their decision preference 
for one of  them. Subsequently, participants read 
the protocol of  a fictitious discussion they suppos-
edly had had with two other group members and 
then made their final choice. The discussion proto-
col contained all available information, revealing 
Candidate A as the best choice. The information 
contributed by the fictitious other group members 
in the protocol predominantly supported the sub-
optimal Candidate B. Consequently, Candidate B 
was supported by shared (i.e., socially validated) 
information in all experimental conditions. The ini-
tial information assigned to the participants varied: 
in condition Pref_B, the participants’ prediscussion 
information (like that of  their cogroup members) 
implied Candidate B was the best, and hence, the 
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participants’ suboptimal preference was supported 
by the socially validated information. Thus, this 
condition constituted a replication of  the hidden 
profile conditions by Greitemeyer and Schulz-
Hardt. In condition Pref_C however, the partici-
pants’ initial information set implied an alternative 
that was suboptimal as well, but not supported by 
the arguments of  their fictitious discussion part-
ners, namely Candidate C. Note that in this condi-
tion, the tendency to stick to one’s initial preference 
should lead participants to choose Candidate C 
after having read the discussion protocol, whereas a 
social validation effect (i.e., reliance on shared 
information) should lead participants to select 
Candidate B. As a control, the prediscussion infor-
mation given in condition Pref_A made the best 
choice (Candidate A) evident right away (manifest 
profile condition).
If  we are correct in assuming that the individ-
ual preference effect does not require social vali-
dation of  information supporting the initially 
preferred candidate, suboptimal individual prefer-
ences should affect the final decision even if  full 
information about the alternative is given after the 
initial preference information. In particular, if  
most of  the participants in condition Pref_C stick 
to Candidate C even though the socially validated 
information favors Candidate B, we can conclude 
that the individual preference effect does not 
require the co-occurrence of  social validation and 
thus is sufficient to cause most or all participants 
to stick to their original preference. 
Method
Participants and design The sample included 90 
students (65 female, 25 male; mean age = 24 years) 
who were offered refreshments in exchange for 
participation. The experiment had a one-factorial 
between-subjects design with three conditions in 
which a preference was induced either for Candidate 
A, B, or C: Pref_A versus Pref_B versus Pref_C.
Materials We adopted a decision case already 
used in a group experiment reported by Brodbeck, 
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, and Schulz-Hardt 
(2002). The materials consisted of  summary 
descriptions of  three hypothetical candidates 
applying for a professorship. The full informa-
tion set comprised 35 attributes which were posi-
tive (e.g., “The candidate is seen as helpful to 
others”), neutral (e.g., “The candidate is 34 years 
old”), or negative (e.g., “The candidate does not 
allow interruptions of  any kind during lectures”). 
The full candidate information consisted of  12 
attributes for each candidate (with the neutral 
information item “The candidate is married” being 
used for two candidates) and implied Candidate 
A to be the best decision (eight positive, one 
neutral, and three negative items), followed by 
Candidates B and C (five positive, four neutral, 
and three negative items, each). The pretest 
results regarding the candidates’ attributes and 
the information distribution are reported in the 
article by Brodbeck et al. (2002).
In all three experimental conditions, partici-
pants were given only partial information prior to 
reading the discussion protocol. Out of  the full 
information set, participants in condition Pref_A 
initially received a subset of  items describing A as 
the best candidate (seven positive, one neutral, no 
negative), superior both to Candidate B (five pos-
itive, two neutral, one negative) and Candidate C 
(three positive, four neutral, one negative). In 
condition Pref_B, the items in the information 
subset favored Candidate B (five positive, two 
neutral, one negative), followed by Candidate C 
(three positive, four neutral, one negative) and 
Candidate A (four positive, one neutral, three 
negative). In condition Pref_C, Candidate C was 
the best initial choice (five positive, three neutral, 
no negative items), followed by Candidates A and 
B (four positive, one neutral, three negative items 
each). For every item subset, the superiority of  
the respective candidate was confirmed by a pre-
test with a total of  60 students. In condition 
Pref_A, Candidate A was judged by 89% of  the 
participants as the best, followed by Candidates B 
and C (5% each). In condition Pref_B, Candidate 
B was chosen by 76%, followed by Candidate C 
(14%) and Candidate A (10%). And in condition 
Pref_C, Candidate C was picked by 85%, followed 
by Candidate B (10%) and Candidate A (5%). 
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The informational pattern of  the subset assigned 
to the participants’ two fictitious group members 
remained the same in all experimental conditions, 
arguing in favor of  Candidate B. Thus, the two 
fictitious group members in all conditions received 
the identical information distribution as partici-
pants of  condition Pref_B.
The participants were instructed to imagine 
that they were involved in the discussion. In the 
discussion protocol, the protagonists were labeled 
“You” (i.e., the group member who had received 
the same information set as the participant), 
“Person 1”, and “Person 2”. In all conditions, the 
protocol contained all 35 attributes overall avail-
able, and the wording and order of  the informa-
tion mentioned was identical. The preferences of  
the two fictitious group members (i.e., Person 1 and 
Person 2) were not mentioned. Different topics 
were discussed, one after the other. The informa-
tion items were presented without evaluating 
comments and no inferences about which candi-
date might be the best were made. Unshared pieces 
of  information were mentioned by the one group 
member who individually possessed this item and 
were not commented upon by the two others. 
When a shared argument was mentioned, the 
group members whose prediscussion informa-
tion set also contained this item confirmed it. 
(An example is, “Person 2: ‘Candidate C has one 
child.’ Person 1 and you say that you also possess 
this information.”) Because Person 1 and Person 2 
initially received a preponderance of  information 
in favor of  candidate B, the socially validated 
information supported B in all experimental con-
ditions. Please note that since there was no infor-
mation partially shared between Person 1 and 
Person 2 (i.e., shared by them but not by the par-
ticipant) in the experimental conditions Pref_B 
and Pref_C, the items which were socially vali-
dated were always known by the participants 
prior to reading the discussion protocol. In other 
words, in both experimental conditions there was 
social validation of  the participants’ own infor-
mation but no social validation of  information 
new to the participant. Out of  12 shared items 
overall available in each experimental condition, 
four were first mentioned by the participant, 
four by Person 1, and four by Person 2. Thus, 
introduction of  shared information into discus-
sion and validation of  this information by others 
was balanced across the three group members. 
The protocol ended after all items had been 
exchanged.
Procedure A cover letter outlined the aim of  
the study, namely an investigation into how teach-
ing staff  are assessed. Participants received the 
initial information set and were asked to indicate 
which candidate they preferred. Next, partici-
pants learned that decisions like the one at hand 
were often made by groups following a group dis-
cussion. To simulate such a situation, they would 
receive a protocol of  a real group discussion. 
After that, the initial information set was collected 
before the protocol was handed out. As a conse-
quence, as is typical in hidden profile studies, par-
ticipants had to rely on their memory for the 
information previously read when receiving full 
information. Before reading the protocol, partici-
pants were also informed that the three group 
members acting in the protocol did not have 
identical information. However, based on the full 
information documented, one candidate was 
clearly better than the other two. The participants’ 
task was to identify the best candidate. Successful 
participants would take part in a raffle to win one 
of  20 CD vouchers. After they had finished read-
ing the protocol, participants were asked to make 
their final decision about which candidate was 
best. Finally, they were debriefed and thanked for 
participating.
Results and discussion
Seven participants had to be excluded from statis-
tical analyses. Three of  them made ambiguous 
statements concerning their prediscussion pref-
erence, another three showed random answer 
behavior in large parts of  the experiment and one 
guessed the purpose of  the study. Of  these seven 
participants, one was originally assigned to condi-
tion Pref_C, and three each to conditions Pref_A 
and Pref_B. A manipulation check showed that 
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the experimental induction of  the individual 
decision preferences was successful overall, with 
90% of  the participants choosing the candidate 
implied by their information subsets. Eight par-
ticipants whose prediscussion choice differed 
from the preference induced were excluded from 
all analyses. This seems appropriate since we are 
interested in the conditions under which partici-
pants are unable to give up their suboptimal 
prediscussion preference when faced with full 
information. Obviously, if  a participant favors 
the optimal solution right from the beginning and 
sticks to this solution, it would not be correct to 
say that this person had overcome the individual 
preference effect or the influence of  social valida-
tion, respectively. Four of  the participants excluded 
were originally assigned to condition Pref_B, two 
each to conditions Pref_A and Pref_C. However, 
the results of  all significance tests reported below 
remained the same when all 90 participants were 
included.
Decision quality
Of  all participants included in the analyses (75 
participants), 45% chose candidate A after having 
read the discussion protocol and, therefore, made 
the correct choice. Thirty-one percent of  the par-
ticipants selected Candidate B as most suited and 
24% chose Candidate C. The participants’ final 
decisions significantly depended on the experi-
mental condition, c²(4, N = 75) = 36.10, p < .001. 
Post hoc tests revealed that in condition Pref_A 
(i.e., the manifest profile condition) the best alter-
native (Candidate A) was chosen more frequently 
(76%) than Candidates B (16%), c²(1, N = 23) = 
9.78, p < .005, and C (8%), c²(1, N = 21) = 13.76, 
p < .001. Conversely, in condition Pref_B, most 
participants picked Candidate B (58%) as the 
best, followed by participants choosing 
Candidates A (38%), c²(1, N = 23) = 6.40, p < .05, 
and C (4%), c²(1, N = 15) = 11.27, p < .005. We 
hence replicated the findings of  Greitemeyer and 
Schulz-Hardt (2003; Experiment 1), who found 
that most participants in the manifest profile 
condition chose the best candidate, whereas 
most participants in the hidden profile condition 
selected the suboptimal candidate implied by 
their prediscussion information and additionally 
supported by socially validated information. In 
condition Pref_C, where the individual prefer-
ence effect and the social validation effect had 
different decisional implications, Candidate C (58%) 
was chosen more frequently than both Candidate 
A (23%), c²(1, N = 21) = 3.86, p < .05, and 
Candidate B (19%), c²(1, N = 20) = 5.00, p < .05. 
Thus, participants who preferred Candidate C 
based on their prediscussion information pre-
dominantly stuck to their initial choice, even 
though the implication of  the full information 
was Candidate A, and the implication of  the socially 
validated information was Candidate B. 
In general, final decisions were largely deter-
mined by the participants’ prediscussion prefer-
ences, with 65% of  the participants maintaining 
their initial choice, compared to 35% correcting it 
one way or the other. Therefore, the participants’ 
initial preferences were significantly associated 
with their final choices as shown by a Chi-Square 
Test for independence, c²(4, N = 75) = 37.94, p < 
.001.3 A direct comparison showed that the per-
centages of  participants sticking to their initial 
preference were exactly the same in conditions 
Pref_B and Pref_C (58%, each), c²(1, N = 30) = 0, 
p = 1. Hence, the individual preference effect hin-
ders the solution of  hidden profiles even if  infor-
mation supporting the group members’ initial 
preference is not supported by social validation.
Please note that a limitation of  our findings is 
that we did not rotate the items across conditions. 
Therefore, the individual preference effect in 
Experiment 1 could (at least in part) be due to 
some systematic differences in the candidates’ 
attributes. To rule out this possibility, we rotated 
the items across conditions in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
As noted above, in the Greitemeyer and Schulz-
Hardt (2003) study, the information was pre-
sented in a discussion format and, hence, some 
typical attributes of  verbal social interaction were 
retained (e.g., whole sentences and filler words). 
As recently shown, the probability of  solving a 
 at LMU Muenchen on June 13, 2013gpi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
660  Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(5) 
hidden profile is significantly lower when full 
information is simply presented as a protocol of  
a group discussion to be read rather than when 
listed and structured by the participants as they 
read through the protocol (Voigtlaender et al., 
2009). This implies that presenting the informa-
tion in a discussion format makes it harder for the 
participants to integrate the new information, 
thereby promoting the individual preference 
effect. Arguably, such residues of  group proc-
esses as found in the Greitemeyer and Schulz-
Hardt experiments may have hampered the solution 
of  the hidden profile compared to a situation 
without any features of  a group discussion. In 
other words, we cannot rule out that the low solu-
tion rates found by Greitemeyer and Schulz-
Hardt and also in our Experiment 1 were at least 
partially due to the specific format used to present 
the pieces of  information.
Therefore, the first goal of  Experiment 2 was 
to provide evidence for the individual preference 
effect in an experimental setting freed as much as 
possible from residues of  group interaction. 
Hence, in Experiment 2, we did not use discus-
sion protocols. Instead, full information was pre-
sented to individuals in the same manner as it is 
given to groups prior to interaction in typical 
hidden profile experiments (e.g., Brodbeck et al., 
2002; Scholten, van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & 
De Dreu, 2007; Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, 
Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006). Speci-
fically, participants in Experiment 2 received not 
only their own initial information set but also the 
sets assigned to their two hypothetical fellow 
group members in the form of  one-page bullet-
pointed item lists. Thus, as participants read their 
own initial item list and the two “original” item 
lists of  their (fictitious) cogroup members, all 
items were presented in an analogous manner. 
This made it possible to provide the participants 
with full information without resorting to a 
verbal communication format.
However, even if  we were to find evidence for 
the idea that the individual preference effect 
causes groups to fail at hidden profiles in the 
absence of  any group-interaction residues, it 
would still be unclear to what extent it would be 
necessary to refer to group processes to explain 
the empirically observed low solution rates of  
real interacting groups. Therefore, the second 
goal of  Experiment 2 was to compare the per-
formance of  individuals working on a hidden 
profile task to the performance of  real interacting 
groups.
To achieve these two goals, four experimen-
tal conditions were applied. In the hidden pro-
file/individual condition, participants received 
a candidate information list supporting a subop-
timal alternative and were asked to indicate their 
preference. Thereafter, they received the two 
remaining item lists and made their final choice 
based on all three lists. This is the psychological 
equivalent of  a group member experiencing per-
fect information exchange in the group: the 
person enters the group with her/his own pre-
discussion information and, without any loss or 
any detracting elements, learns what the other 
group members know. In the manifest profile 
condition, no suboptimal initial preference was 
induced. Instead, participants received a one-
page list containing all available information and 
were asked to make a decision after having read 
this list. We predicted that participants in the lat-
ter condition are more likely to detect the cor-
rect solution than participants in the first 
condition. Note, however, that a difference in 
the solution rates between these two experimen-
tal conditions could be due to both the individ-
ual preference effect and the simple fact that in 
the hidden profile/individual condition the 
information supporting the participants’ initial 
preferences appeared on all three information 
lists and thus was repeated, which could lead to 
a higher decision impact of  these items. To dis-
tinguish between these two possibilities, we 
included the no-preference induction/individual con-
dition, in which participants received all three 
information lists at once, without making a pre-
liminary choice based on a single list. Therefore, 
no initial preference was formed that could 
cause an individual preference effect, and differ-
ences in the results hence can be attributed 
exclusively to the repetition of  information 
supporting the participants’ preferred choice.
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To answer our second research question, 
namely to what extent it is necessary to refer 
to group processes to explain the empirically 
observed low solution rates of  real interacting 
groups, in Experiment 2 we also included a real-
group hidden profile condition and compared the 
solution rates in this condition with the corre-
sponding individual hidden profile condition. To 
this end, with the hidden profile/group condition 
we employed a condition that is typically used in 
hidden profile research: after having individually 
received their initial information and having indi-
cated their candidate preference, participants 
were asked to discuss the decision case in a three-
person group and reach a unanimous decision. In 
this condition the group members collectively 
received exactly the same item lists as the partici-
pants in the hidden profile/individual and the no-
preference induction/individual conditions. Note 
that in the hidden profile literature it is usual to 
compare the solution rate of  groups who worked 
on a hidden profile to groups who worked with 
full information, that is, an extreme form of  a 
manifest profile (e.g., Brodbeck et al., 2002; 
Lavery et al., 1999; Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 
2010; Scholten et al., 2007; Schulz-Hardt et al., 
2006). Therefore, after having made their individ-
ual decision, participants in the manifest profile 
condition were also assigned to three-person 
groups and additionally made a unanimous deci-
sion comparable to the decisions of  the hidden 
profile groups. Thus, in the manifest profile con-
dition both individual-level and group-level data 
were collected.
Method
Participants and design The sample included 
95 students (39 female, 56 male; mean age = 27 
years), who were offered refreshments in 
exchange for participation. We employed a one-
factorial between-subjects design with four con-
ditions: hidden profile/individual (17 individual 
participants) versus manifest profile (15 individ-
ual participants) versus no-preference induction/
individual (18 individual participants) versus 
hidden profile/group (15 three-person groups).
Materials Similar to Experiment 1, materials 
consisted of  attributes characterizing three candi-
dates for a professorship. The full information 
set comprised 45 items. These items were selected 
from a pool of  153 positive, neutral, and negative 
pieces of  information which had been rated for 
their valence and relevance with regard to the job 
as a professor in a first pretest with 98 partici-
pants (prior to this experiment). Full information 
described Candidate A as the best choice (nine 
positive, three neutral, three negative items), 
Candidate C as second best (six positive, six neu-
tral, three negative items), and Candidate B as 
least suitable (six positive, three neutral, six nega-
tive items). A second pretest with 52 students had 
confirmed that this information distribution was 
clear as 87% of  the participants chose Candidate 
A, 9% Candidate C, and 4% Candidate B. 
The information distribution used to create a 
hidden profile was identical to the distributions in 
the experiments reported by Greitemeyer and 
Schulz-Hardt (2003) and Greitemeyer, Schulz-
Hardt, Brodbeck, and Frey (2006). For this hid-
den profile information distribution (used in all 
conditions besides the manifest profile), the total 
items available were divided between three one-
page information lists with nine attributes per 
candidate and list. Each list was designed to imply 
Candidate B as the best choice (six positive, one 
neutral, two negative items), and Candidates C 
(four positive, two neutral, three negative items) 
and A (three positive, three neutral, three negative 
items) as less desirable. In a third pretest with 28 
students, Candidate B was selected as the best 
suited alternative by 83% of  the participants 
choosing on the basis of  the first information list, 
by 90% choosing on the basis of  the second list, 
and by 60% choosing on the basis of  the third 
list. Taken together, the three lists contained all 
available information on the Candidates A, B, and 
C with some of  the items being shared and others 
being unshared.
In all experimental conditions, participants 
received full information before making the final 
choice, either individually or distributed between 
the members of  a discussion group. Obviously, 
however, in the hidden profile/group condition 
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unshared information of  one group member 
was only available to the other group members if  
this member actually mentioned this piece of  
information during discussion.
Procedure In all conditions participants were 
told that they would work on a personnel-selection 
task and should make a decision about which of  
the three candidates should be hired. The experi-
menter emphasized that one of  the candidates was 
clearly the best based on the full information and 
that cinema vouchers would be given to those who 
successfully identified this optimal choice.
The hidden profile/individual and the no-
preference induction/individual condition differed 
only in the preliminary choice participants made 
before they read full information. In the hidden 
profile/individual condition, participants first 
received one of  the information lists labeled “X” 
and introduced as “Your information about the 
three candidates”. They were asked to study the 
candidate descriptions and to document their pref-
erence on a separate questionnaire sheet. Then, 
participants additionally received the two remain-
ing lists labeled “Y” and “Z” and introduced as 
“Information of  colleague Y” and “Information 
of  colleague Z”, respectively. The lists Y and Z 
were described as information that two other col-
leagues had extracted from the candidates’ applica-
tions. After having received all three lists and 
having been given as much time as needed to study 
these, participants were asked to make their final 
decision based on all available information.
In contrast, in the no-preference induction/
individual condition, participants made no initial 
choice. They were handed all three lists, X, Y, and 
Z, together, introduced as “Information of  col-
league X”, “Information of  colleague Y”, and 
“Information of  colleague Z”, the information that 
three colleagues had received about the job candi-
dates. Participants were asked to make a decision 
about which candidate was best suited for the pro-
fessorship based on all available information. In 
both conditions, we rotated which one of  the three 
lists was labeled as either “X”, “Y”, or “Z”, thus 
counterbalancing the order of  presentation of  lists.
In the hidden profile/group condition, each 
of  the participants individually received one of  
the information lists X, Y, and Z. In the manifest 
profile condition each participant was handed out 
a list with full information, beginning with infor-
mation about A, then information about B, and 
then information about C. Note that this full 
information list contained every piece of  infor-
mation only once (i.e., there were no repetitions). 
After having read this prediscussion information, 
participants were asked to indicate their individ-
ual preference for one of  the candidates. Next, 
the information sheets and questionnaires were 
collected and three-person groups were assem-
bled (consisting of  one X-, one Y-, and one 
Z-member in the hidden profile/group condi-
tion). Each group was instructed to discuss the 
decision case and make a unanimous decision. 
After the final decision was made, the experiment 
was over. Participants were debriefed and thanked 
for participation.
Results and discussion
One participant originally assigned to the hidden 
profile/individual condition guessed the purpose 
of  the study and was excluded from all statistical 
analyses. However, including this person did not 
change the results.4 A manipulation check showed 
that the case material successfully induced a hid-
den profile, with Candidate B being the initial 
preference of  most participants in the hidden 
profile/group (91%) and the hidden profile/ 
individual (94%) condition. 
Decision quality
When comparing all individual conditions, deci-
sion quality significantly differed across condi-
tions, c²(3, N = 64) = 28.89, p < .001 (see Figure 1). 
Post hoc comparisons showed that participants in 
the hidden profile/individual condition found 
the correct solution significantly less frequently 
(25%) than both individuals assigned to the man-
ifest profile condition (87%), c²(1, N = 31) = 
11.89, p < .005, and participants in the no-
preference induction/individual condition (78%), 
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c²(1, N = 34) = 9.47, p < .01, with the latter two 
conditions not significantly differing from each 
other, c²(1, N = 33) = .453, p = .665. In other 
words, we found that participants with subopti-
mal initial preferences were less likely to choose 
the correct candidate than participants without 
such preferences, thereby providing evidence for 
an individual preference effect.
As described above, after having stated their 
individual decision based on full information, 
participants in the manifest profile condition were 
assembled into three-person groups. When the 
final choices made in groups were compared, we 
noted that all manifest profile groups (100%) had 
found the correct solution, compared to only 1 
out of  15 (7%) of  the hidden profile groups, 
c²(1, N = 20) = 15.56, p < .001 (see Figure 1). 
This replicates the consistent finding that groups 
typically fail to solve hidden profiles (e.g., Stasser 
& Titus, 1985).
A comparison of  the performance of  groups 
to the performance of  individuals in the hidden 
profile conditions revealed that 1 out of  15 (7%) 
groups and 4 out of  16 (25%) individuals solved 
the hidden profile. This difference is not significant, 
c²(1, N = 31) = 1.92, p = .333. Please note 
Full name of conditions and summary of the steps to reach the decision:
HP indiv. Hidden profile/individual
List X → preference → lists Y and Z → decision
MP indiv. Manifest profile/individual
Full information → decision
No-pref. indiv. No-preference induction/individual
Lists X, Y, and Z → decision
HP group Hidden profile/group
List X → preference → group discussion → decision
MP group Manifest profile/group
Full information → preference → group discussion → decision
25%
87%
78%
7%
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0%
50%
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Figure 1. Decision quality dependent on information distribution and level of  decision-making in Experiment 2.
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that, in contrast to Experiment 1, we rotated 
the information across conditions in Experiment 2. 
Therefore, we can exclude systematic differences 
in the candidates’ attributes being responsible for 
the individual preference effect.
Three possible limitations of  our findings 
should be mentioned at this point. First, it is con-
ceivable that floor effects or low test power led to 
Type II errors. This might, for example, have hap-
pened for the comparison between the hidden 
profile/group and the hidden profile/individual 
condition and, thus, the individual preference 
effect may not be sufficient to fully account for 
the failure of  groups to solve hidden profiles.
Second, in the hidden profile/individual condi-
tion, the first information list, which provided the 
basis for forming the initial preference, was intro-
duced to the participants as “Your information 
about the three candidates” whereas the first list in 
the no-preference induction/individual condition 
was labeled “Information of  colleague X”. As 
research regarding the so-called ownership bias 
(van Swol, Savadori, & Sniezek, 2003) shows, peo-
ple tend to evaluate own information more posi-
tively than information contributed by other 
group members (see also Chernyshenko, Miner, 
Baumann, & Sniezek, 2003; Mojzisch et al., in 
press; van Swol et al., 2003). It is possible that par-
ticipants in the hidden profile/individual condi-
tion experienced a higher degree of  ownership 
regarding the initial information set. This could 
have contributed to the maintenance of  subopti-
mal initial preferences in the hidden profile/indi-
vidual condition. Mojzisch et al. (in press) showed 
that both ownership and preference consistency 
independently affect the evaluation of  informa-
tion. However, a comparison of  the impact of  
these two characteristics on final decisions remains 
to be examined in further research.
Third, it should be explicitly noted that shared 
information appeared on all three item lists X, Y, 
and Z. Therefore, participants in the hidden 
profile/individual condition and the no-preference 
induction/individual condition indirectly learned 
which of  the pieces of  information from their 
original information set were also known by the 
two other group members. It is possible that 
these participants felt socially validated in some 
way. Hence, we cannot fully exclude that social 
validation supported the individual preference 
effect in the hidden profile/individual condition. 
However, as the solution rate for the hidden pro-
file in the no-preference induction/individual 
condition is not significantly lower than in the 
manifest profile/individual condition, we can, at 
least, assume that potential social validation 
effects due to information repetition did not have 
a particularly strong impact.
Real and potential group performance
At first glance, the result that there is no signifi-
cant difference in the solution rate of  participants 
assigned to the hidden profile/individual condi-
tion compared to the hidden profile groups 
seems to imply that group-level processes are not 
necessary at all to explain the failure at hidden 
profile tasks. However, the explanatory power of  
this result is limited because we compared the 
decision quality of  individuals with the decision 
quality of  three-person groups. Yet, as the group 
performance literature suggests, when comparing 
individual to group performance, not the indi-
vidual performance per se but its group-level 
equivalent should be used (cf. Steiner, 1972). To 
assess this so-called group potential, we have to 
answer the question of  how hypothetical three-
member groups that were only influenced by the 
individual preference effect but not by any dys-
functional group processes would have decided 
in our experiment. According to the results of  
the hidden profile/individual condition, such 
groups comprised, on average, 75% of  members 
voting for a suboptimal alternative even though 
they received full information, and 25% of  mem-
bers who chose the correct alternative when 
faced with full information. Which decisions 
would such groups make? Basically, at least two 
different schemes can be applied to predict the 
decisions of  such groups (cf. Davis, 1973).
If  the majority model is applied, a three-person 
group would solve the hidden profile only if  at 
least two of  the three members favored the cor-
rect solution after the information exchange. In 
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our case, the probability of  two or three members 
proposing the correct solution and therefore 
choosing the best candidate is the sum of  the 
probability of  obtaining a group with two correct 
members and one incorrect member, (0.25 × 0.25 
× 0.75) × 3 = 14%, and the probability of  obtaining 
a group with three correct members, (0.25 × 0.25 
× 0.25) × 1 = 2%. In other words, 16% of  the 
groups applying this decision rule would solve 
the hidden profile. This hypothetical solution rate 
(16%) is not significantly different from the actual 
solution rate of  our hidden profile groups (7%), 
c²(1, N = 15) = .97, p = .324. Therefore, if  
groups applied the majority model, the individual 
preference effect would be more or less sufficient 
to explain the empirically documented extent of  
the groups’ failure. Even if  no dysfunctional group 
processes were present at all, groups generally 
would fail to solve the hidden profile.
Ideally, however, groups follow the truth wins 
model. This model indicates that the correct solu-
tion, once proposed, is always adopted by the 
group. Thus, only a single group member would 
need to detect the best alternative to convince the 
other members of  its superiority. In other words, 
the truth wins model implies that the agreement 
on the best alternative is made without any coor-
dination losses within the group (Steiner, 1972). 
In a three-person group, the probability of  a sin-
gle member proposing the correct solution is 1 − 
(0.75 × 0.75 × 0.75) = 58%. Given the truth wins 
model, the hypothetical solution rate of  a group 
only influenced by the individual preference 
effect therefore is 58%, which is significantly 
higher than the empirical solution rate of  the 
groups in the hidden profile/group condition 
(7%), c²(1, N = 15) = 16.22, p < .001. However, 
this result implies that groups—even if  they 
followed an ideal decision scheme and even if  no 
impeding group processes were present at all—
would only find the correct solution in somewhat 
more than half  of  all cases.
General discussion
For 25 years, the failure of  groups to solve hidden 
profiles has been predominantly explained by 
group-level processes (for a review, see Stasser & 
Birchmeier, 2003). Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt 
(2003) proposed an alternative perspective, the 
individual preference effect. According to this 
approach, groups fail to solve hidden profiles 
because their members tend to stick to their erro-
neous initial preferences. However, previous evi-
dence for the individual preference effect came 
from experimental settings which still included two 
group-level processes, namely (a) social validation 
of  the information supporting the participants’ 
suboptimal preference, and (b) presentation of  the 
additional information necessary to solve the hid-
den profile in a discussion format (Greitemeyer & 
Schulz-Hardt, 2003).
The present study aimed to provide more 
clear-cut evidence for the idea that the individual 
preference effect is indeed a purely individual-
level phenomenon which does not depend upon 
the co-occurrence of  group-level processes. In 
Experiment 1 we sought to disentangle the indi-
vidual preference effect and the effect of  social 
validation. Our results demonstrate that when the 
individual preference effect and social validation 
of  the participants’ own information lead to con-
tradictory predictions, the individual preference 
effect prevails: participants maintained their ini-
tial preference even though the socially validated 
information favored another alternative. Hence, 
the individual preference effect hinders the solu-
tion of  hidden profiles even if  information sup-
porting the group members’ initial preference is 
not supported by social validation.
In Experiment 2, we aimed to provide evidence 
for the individual preference effect in an experi-
mental setting freed as much as possible of  fea-
tures of  verbal social interaction. Therefore, in 
contrast to previous research, we did not use a 
discussion protocol to simulate information 
exchange (cf. Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003), 
but provided full information on simple, bullet-
pointed item lists. As predicted, participants with 
suboptimal initial preferences were less likely to 
solve a hidden profile than participants without 
such preferences. The individual preference effect 
hinders the detection of  a hidden profile’s best 
choice, even if  not supported by a discussion-like 
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presentation format or repetition of  misleading 
information. In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 provide 
first-time evidence for the idea that the individual 
preference effect is an individual-driven process 
that is capable of  impeding the solution of  hid-
den profiles, even when efforts have been made 
to eliminate hindering group processes as far as 
possible.
Still the question remains as to how much of  
the overall failure of  groups to solve hidden pro-
files is due to the individual preference effect as 
compared to the group-level processes proposed 
in previous research. We addressed this question 
in Experiment 2 by directly comparing the per-
formance of  individuals to the performance of  
three-person groups working on exactly the same 
hidden profile task. Our results indicate that if  
groups follow the common decision scheme of  
majority rule (Davis, 1973), the individual prefer-
ence effect is sufficient to fully explain the empir-
ically documented extent of  the failure of  groups 
to solve hidden profiles. Ideally, however, groups 
follow the truth wins model to combine the 
diverging opinions of  their members; that is, they 
adopt the correct solution even if  it is only pro-
posed and defended by a single group member 
(cf. Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). In this case, our 
results showed that the hypothetical solution rate 
of  groups only influenced by the individual pref-
erence effect is 58%. In other words, even if  
groups follow the truth wins model, the individ-
ual preference effect is sufficient to explain 
almost half  of  the failure of  groups to solve hid-
den profiles. In sum, if  only the individual prefer-
ence effect was active, even when all relevant 
information is exchanged and when an ideal 
decision scheme applies, still almost half  of  all 
groups would fail to solve a typical hidden profile 
task—provided no additional support is given to 
these groups, for example, by introducing a suc-
cessful group discussion technique (cf. Brodbeck 
et al., 2007). More generally, it is important to 
note that the individual preference effect can 
explain why groups may fail to solve hidden pro-
files even if  the information exchanged is suffi-
cient to allow the solution to be detected (Dennis, 
1996; Greitemeyer et al., 2006). Therefore, one 
important lesson that can be learned from this 
research is that in case of  hidden profiles, increas-
ing the exchange of  unshared information may 
not be sufficient to guarantee high decision qual-
ity. Instead, interventions that aim to facilitate the 
solution of  hidden profiles also have to counter-
act the individual group members’ tendency to 
stick to their initial incorrect preferences.
Limitations
It is possible that the content of  discussion may 
have more impact on group members’ final deci-
sions in real interacting groups than it has on the 
final choice of  individuals working alone. However, 
research suggests that the individual preference 
effect also operates in interacting groups, since 
preference-inconsistent information is devalued by 
group members interacting face-to-face (Klocke, 
2007; Mojzisch et al., 2008; Toma & Butera, 2009; 
van Swol, 2007). Moreover, it has been shown that 
even if  an advocacy group decision procedure is 
applied that precludes members from prematurely 
aggregating their preferences and that leads to 
more comprehensive information pooling, group 
decisions are not improved in hidden profile situa-
tions (Greitemeyer et al., 2006), which could be 
due to the individual preference effect. Also, a 
recent study has revealed that even if  information 
items are used that allow a direct comparison of  
decision alternatives and thus should facilitate the 
solution of  the hidden profile, group members 
mostly did not integrate information contradicting 
their prediscussion preferences—although these 
groups did not sample more preference-consistent 
shared than preference-inconsistent unshared 
information (Reimer, Kuendig, Hoffrage, Park, & 
Hinsz, 2007). Nevertheless, investigating the indi-
vidual preference effect in real groups to further 
elucidate its mode of  operation represents a 
promising endeavor for future research.
We argue that in hidden profiles where shared-
ness and preference-consistency of  information 
are confounded to some extent, it may often appear 
that people favor shared over unshared informa-
tion, but the real driving force behind this phe-
nomenon is preference-consistency. However, it is 
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important to state explicitly that the individual 
preference effect does not rule out shared informa-
tion having an evaluation advantage (Greitemeyer 
et al., 2003) and a discussion advantage (Stasser, 
1992) over unshared information—independent 
of  the information’s preference-consistency. Hence, 
any effects that involve these “true” sharedness 
advantages are clearly beyond the scope of  our 
preference-effect approach.
Implications and future directions
Our results imply that an investigation of  individ-
ual-level processes in general and of  the individual 
preference effect in particular is not only worth-
while, but also necessary to explain why groups 
fail to solve hidden profile tasks. Our proposition 
is in line with other recent studies suggesting that 
the failure of  groups to solve hidden profiles may 
not only be a function of  problems with group 
interaction, but also due to individual-level pro-
cesses (see also Klocke, 2007; van Swol, 2007). Of  
course, this does not mean to say that we deny the 
existence of  hindering group-level processes. 
Clearly, a group which fails to discuss the critical 
unshared information is unlikely to solve a hidden 
profile. Thus, we assume that the individual pref-
erence effect does not contradict but rather sup-
plements existing group-level explanations. In 
fact, group-level processes might even moderate 
the operation of  the individual preference effect 
(and vice versa). For instance, it is conceivable that 
in situations in which group members unani-
mously prefer an incorrect alternative, the indi-
vidual preference effect could be even stronger 
than when individuals work alone. To test for pos-
sible moderating influences, future research could 
separately manipulate whether or not certain 
group processes can occur (e.g., by discussion for-
mat) and whether or not individual preferences 
were formed.
As hidden profiles represent the prototype of  
situations in which groups have the potential to 
outperform individuals in terms of  decision qual-
ity, many researchers have developed interven-
tions aimed at enabling groups to effectively 
handle hidden profile situations (e.g., Galinsky & 
Kray, 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Hollingshead, 
1996; Klocke, 2007; Larson, Christensen, Franz, 
& Abbott, 1998; Scholten et al., 2007; Stasser, 
Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995). However, most 
interventions have focused on the dominance of  
shared information or premature preference 
negotiation, and thus on the insufficient exchange 
of  unshared information (for exceptions, see 
Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2010; Postmes et al., 
2001). Interestingly, Gigone and Hastie (1993) 
did report that even if  group members pooled 
sufficient information to solve a hidden profile, 
groups still failed to integrate the unshared cues. 
Unfortunately, they did not give any reasons for 
the failure of  unshared information to signifi-
cantly influence the group decision. The individ-
ual preference effect can provide an explanation: 
group members stick to their initial preferences 
because they evaluate the information exchanged 
in the light of  these preferences. The unshared 
and thus preference-inconsistent information is 
systematically devalued and therefore barely 
taken into account when making the group deci-
sion. In line with the observation made by Gigone 
and Hastie (1993), most interventions focusing 
on the exchange of  unshared information have 
not been successful in enhancing group decision 
quality (cf. Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). As our 
findings imply, group-level interventions—even 
assuming that they eliminated all dysfunctional 
group-level processes entirely—can only improve 
decision quality in little more than half  of  the 
cases at best. At worst, interventions do not lead 
to any improvements at all, as long as the imped-
ing effects on the individual level are not taken 
into account. In conclusion, we believe it is prom-
ising to take a closer look at mediating and mod-
erating factors of  the individual preference effect. 
This would not only enrich group decision- 
making theory, but also form a solid basis for the 
development of  effective interventions facilitat-
ing the solution of  hidden profile tasks. Some 
interesting suggestions may be taken from recent 
literature. For example, Scholten et al. (2007) 
found that a high degree of  epistemic motivation 
leads to an effortful analysis of  the information 
exchanged in group discussions. It would be 
 at LMU Muenchen on June 13, 2013gpi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
668  Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(5) 
interesting to investigate whether a high degree 
of  epistemic motivation also has an attenuating 
effect on biased evaluation of  information. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine 
if  the individual preference effect is moderated 
by whether the group members’ preferences are 
based on attractions toward alternatives, on aver-
sions to alternatives, or on combinations of  both. 
This difference has recently been found to have a 
strong impact on information processing in 
groups (Nijstad & Kaps, 2008). Moreover, given 
prior work on the importance of  minority dissent 
in improving the solution rates in hidden profile 
tasks (e.g., Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006), it might be 
interesting to explore in more detail how the indi-
vidual preference effect is moderated by the con-
stellation of  the decision preferences of  the 
group members. Finally, it is important to note 
that in everyday decision-making groups, indi-
viduals typically face a mixture of  cooperative 
incentives to reach high-quality decisions and 
competitive incentives to reach their personal 
goals (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 
2008; Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 
2004). Recent research shows that when in com-
petition with each other, group members are 
more reluctant to disconfirm their initial prefer-
ences compared to when cooperating with each 
other (Toma & Butera, 2009). This finding tenta-
tively indicates that competition might increase 
the individual preference effect. Since pressure to 
compete with others is commonplace in organi-
zational and political settings, this finding high-
lights the importance of  the individual preference 
effect in organizational and political decision-
making groups.
To recap, there is no doubt that group-level 
processes play an important role in group deci-
sion-making: if  groups fail to exchange the criti-
cal unshared information, it is unlikely that they 
will solve a hidden profile. Notwithstanding the 
importance of  group-level processes, the present 
study shows that group-level processes do not tell 
the whole story, and that the individual prefer-
ence effect is capable of  impeding the solution of  
hidden profiles even if  few or no hindering 
group-level processes are present.
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Notes
1. Note that by a manifest profile we mean any infor-
mation distribution for which the participants’ 
information set is representative of  the entire 
information set. Under this definition, providing 
participants with full information from the begin-
ning is but one (and the lengthiest) form of  a 
manifest profile possible.
2. Note that in the studies of  Postmes et al. (2001) 
and Wittenbaum et al. (1999), sharedness and pref-
erence consistency of  information were partially 
confounded.
3. Of  the eight participants excluded from the analyses 
because their prediscussion choice differed from 
the induced one, six (= 75%) maintained their 
initial preference.
4. In Experiment 2, a total of  four participants 
assigned to the two hidden profile conditions (hidden 
profile/individual and hidden profile/group) initially 
preferred the correct candidate. Diverging from 
Experiment 1, these participants were all included 
in the statistical analyses in order to keep the exper-
imental conditions comparable to each other. If  we 
had excluded the one participant who preferred the 
correct candidate in the individual condition we 
would also have had to exclude all proponents of  
the correct solution in the group condition. In turn, 
this would have made it impossible to appropriately 
compare the real to the potential group perfor-
mance, as the models for calculating the latter, 
which we apply and report here, are based on dif-
ferent distribution of  preferences within the group.
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